



Enough is enough!

NOTE: This is likely to offend some (perhaps many) out there, but that's their business – this **Exposé** of the Rand is our business...

And is critical to your business!

The fact is, it is high time that persons be informed and stop being hurt.

For FAR too long now, the South African public – and yes! – you and the investing and business world – have been fed up with the biggest lot of mumbo jumbo from hamstrung economists and out-of-touch “financial experts” regarding the South African economy and the inherent value of the Rand.

A couple of years ago, these are the very same persons that painted a rosy picture week after week of an economy that was rollicking along, with a future as bright as a thousand candles (before or after Eskom).

And then, SUDDENLY, the Rand's “sharp and unexpected” fall caught them totally by surprise, forcing a change of tune and a looking for all sorts of excuses as to why this has happened, and perhaps why it shouldn't have.

Now, this might have been all right, because the beauty of being an economist is that your job is always secure, no matter how much gobbledygook you speak and write.

BUT, the thousands of businessmen and investors that looked to them as trusted advisors were **also** CAUGHT OUT and LOST OUT – BIG TIME!

And the reason is that **the truth about the South African economy and the Rand was not being told**, and persons were merely being told what these economists wanted them to believe – remember many economic reports are issued to influence the business clients of the source of the reports...

BUT, in some strange way, we feel responsible for what has happened...

“Why,” you may ask? “Were you also banging the same drum?”

No, in fact quite the opposite. You see, we saw this coming – a LONG way off.

In fact, if you had read previous issues of *The Rand – a Fundamental View* (dating back to May 2006), you would have become very much aware that we were predicting an imminent crash.

BUT, what we **didn't do** was SPREAD THE WORD FAR ENOUGH.

And so, this is what we have started, commencing with the February 2008 issue, with the more accurate title:

“Rand Exposé – The Fundamental Truth”

ex-po-sé [èks pō záy]

- Definition 1. an exposure or revelation, often by way of an article or book, which provides shocking or surprising information
2. a declaration of facts: a formal and systematic statement giving facts about something.

The time has come to let it all out – this is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth on the Rand. We will spill ALL the beans (there are no lucky ones we keep to ourselves), and show you the nitty-gritty.

We will give you the lowdown on:

- ❖ What the Rand's true value is, based on at least 3 different collaborations of factual data
- ❖ How competitive South Africa actually is compared to its trading partners
- ❖ How to analyze an economy like a business – like your business
- ❖ Whether the past few years growth has been healthy
- ❖ Whether direct foreign investment is all it is made out to be
- ❖ Whether South Africa is really still a commodity-based economy
- ❖ What danger signals we were looking out for, and what has happened
- ❖ Why the Rand doesn't move in line with trade-competitive fundamentals
- ❖ Where you can expect the Rand to move to in the future
- ❖ ...AND how you can profit handsomely in future by knowing this

This time round, we want to ensure that this gets to as many persons as possible that are affected by the South African economy and/or Rand's movements.


BUT (and this is important)... we want YOU to do your bit.

The basis we are sharing this with you is that, IF you find value in this report, you will undertake to **ensure that every person you know that is affected by the Rand's movements gets their hands on this** as well – you owe it to them to ensure they see things as they should be, and don't get hurt again.


And do you know? They will be indebted to you for it. And we have made it simple – all you have to do is go to this link www.randforecasts.co.za/recommend.php

Agreed? OK, here goes.

Thanks and enjoy!


James Paynter

Note: We have identified charts that have been **updated** since the last issue with a **yellow** star and **new** charts with a **red** star, as shown here.



The Story Behind the Truth

Having been in an export-related business since 1993 (tank container investment management – see www.premiertank.co.za), by 2001 we fully believed (after being 8 years in the business) that we were clearly operating in a definite, steadily-depreciating currency market.

In this period we had seen the Rand rise (fall against the Dollar) in a clear trend from the low R3's to the mid R6's by 1998, and we were not surprised to see this trend continue the next 3 years – although the sharpness of the rise in 2001 to over R13 by the end of the year was mind-numbing.



But from then, our world turned upside down, as the market retraced sharply to R8.50 the next 12 months, and to R6.20 by December 2003 and further in the next few months. And we burnt our fingers badly, like many others out there.

In a few short years, our business model had been turned on its head. This change in the Rand's fortunes was lauded by economists, government and SARB Governor alike, who with one voice acclaimed:

"A Strong Rand is Good – it means a Strong Economy"

...BUT, did it really?

We asked ourselves, "Was this true, and if so, what had changed?"

We looked for answers from traditional "experts". But the more we heard and the more we read, the more it did not make any real, logical sense. Eventually, we decided the only way was for us ourselves to undertake an in-depth study into the Rand, looking at the real fundamentals of the South African economy to determine where the Rand should be, based on these base fundamentals, whether we were now in a "strengthening currency economy" going forward, and to answer the question as to whether the above statement was true or not.

The results of our initial study were first published in July 2004.

But since that date, we have continually updated and expanded it to cover other aspects that affect the South African economy as a whole. And, since that date of course, we have had another MASSIVE rollercoaster ride on the Rand:



In effect, we are back to where persons are asking the same questions we had back in 2004, with the Rand having strengthened significantly after having risen exponentially in the last half of 2008. This makes the need to have the information contained in this study as vital as it ever was.

Having discovered the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, we take pleasure in sharing it with you – **so you can share it with others.**

NOTE: This quarterly issue has been updated with the latest available data to provide a current insight into the fundamentals

1) WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE RATE?

To try and investigate our questions regarding the Rand, we first needed to answer the above question, an essential baseline to this study.

What is an exchange rate? And why does a currency appreciate or depreciate?

In essence, an exchange rate is the **adjusting factor** (an economic mechanism)

...between a domestic economy and that of its international trading partners...

...so that exported goods and services exported remain competitive...

... and goods produced for local consumption are not threatened by cheaper imports.

The exchange rate **compensates for product cost differentials**, and other factors that affect international trade competitiveness.

It is amazing that many don't understand this elementary mechanism and don't appreciate what its prime function is.

So, what are these product cost differentials?

The Domestic Supply Chain Cost of any product and its ultimate Value Added can be reduced to its essential elements:


Labour Cost and Productivity

If there are differentials in underlying Labour Cost and Productivity between two countries producing the same product, the essential adjusting mechanism to enable these countries to continue to trade (whether export or import) at competitive prices is **the exchange rate**.

International trade succeeds through this essential gear working efficiently, or fails if interfered with!

The table below gives an example of how differences in labour cost and productivity between two countries result in an adjustment in cost and therefore comparative price in a product.

Without this gear reacting regularly, *and unimpededly*, SA exporters would not be competitive overseas; in addition, local manufacturers serving the domestic market would not be able to compete with imports from other countries.




South Africa	(Illustrative data used)	United States
R 800	Domestic Price	\$100
	(Base Rate of R8.00/\$)	
105%	Labour Cost Index	101%
	+	
101%	Productivity Index	105%
	=	
4.0%	Change in Product Cost	-4.0%
	Local Price	
R 832	adjusted change in costs	\$96

Export Price Scenario		
R 832	@ Base rate of R8.00/\$	\$104
R 832	@ Strong rate R6.00/\$	\$139
R 832	@ Realistic rate R8.67/\$	\$96

2) THE RAND FOREIGN CURRENCY MARKET

To determine and understand the Rand foreign exchange market within the global market and who the major players are that are active in this market, was an all-important element in our studies.



Firstly, the above chart shows the global currency market, which has exploded as a financial tradable market in the past few years, peaking in 2008 with a Daily turnover of about **\$4 trillion!**

(Note: The tri-annual results for 2008-2010 are due later in 2010 year, but estimates have been calculated for 2008/2009, using survey results from major central banks)

This makes it by far the largest traded market globally, more than all the stock, bond and commodity markets put together.

And to put this in perspective, the total output of the United States economy (Gross Domestic Product) was \$14.2 trillion in 2008. Based on the latest data, the forex market trades more than this **every week!**

Of this vast volume, trades against the South African Rand amount to **less than 0.5%** of the global market turnover. Wow!

The average **daily turnover** on the Rand currency market for 2009 was **US\$10.8 billion**, down from US\$12.8 billion in 2008. By comparison, turnover in 1998 was US\$6.3bn and 1992 was US\$2.3bn.

Who are the players in the Rand currency market? They can be broken down into 3 groups:

- South African exporters and importers of goods and services
- Investors in the South African bond and equity markets and other domestic investments
- Currency traders, who buy and sell the Rand as a mere commodity.

Dollar, this wouldn't make any difference to these players, as long as they enter and exit the market at the right rate and right time.

It can therefore easily be understood that a currency's level is influenced by these large players – who have no real concern as to whether it is “weak” or “strong” – trading it to suit their own purposes, that is, the use that they make of any currency (as a tradable or an investment commodity).


Thus, investors and speculators are largely responsible for *short-term* and *medium-term* price movements.

So what determines the true value of the Rand? **Goods and services**, whether bought or sold.

However, whereas this represents a miniscule portion of the total turnover in the Rand currency market, it determines the *long-term* rate of change and hence the trendline value of the currency –

Eventually, economic forces will ensure that a currency adjusts **back to its true level**, which is determined by *international competitiveness* in **trade of goods and services**.

However, due to leads and lags, there can be huge imbalances in the interim period and considerable diversion from this trendline until economic forces bring the currency back into line.



Per the above Chart, of this total turnover of some US\$10.8 billion in 2009, only **5.9%** related to Goods and Services, the **94.1% balance being investment and speculative!**

This is one of the most important facts to understand concerning the Rand!

And of this 94.1% that is non-trade related, the break down is:

- **69.5% are transactions by foreigners** (Non-Resident Investors/Speculators), having increased from a mere 4.3% in 1992 to 50% in 1998 to current levels.
- **11.9%** are by residents living in South Africa or its neighbours, that is, in the Common Monetary Area (SA Residents Onshore) – down 2.1% pts since 2007.
- **12.6%** are by SA residents living overseas (SA Residents Offshore) – up 2.3% pts since 2007.

Now to ask the important questions:

Do currency traders/speculators care where the Rand is pegged?

- NO, as long as they can make some profit on its movement, either way (e.g. buy at R8.00/\$ and sell at R10.00/\$, or sell at \$9.50 and cover at \$8.00)

Do investors in South African bonds and equities care where the Rand is pegged?

- NO, they are looking for the highest returns, as long as their capital is secure (e.g. bring funds in at R7.00/\$ and earn 10% p.a. in the money market for a year, and take it back out at the same level or better).

If the Rand is at R7.00 to the Dollar or R3.00 or even R300 to the


3) THE BURNING QUESTIONS...

The initial questions to be investigated and answered were:

- **What is the present trendline value** of the Rand?
- What are the **product cost** and **competitiveness differentials** between South Africa and its trading partners?
- **How have these factors changed** over the past years, and especially since the opening up of the South African economy to the global market?
- **What can be expected for the future?**

4) HOW HAS THE RAND PERFORMED HISTORICALLY?

We first looked at the Rand's long term historical performance.



The above Graph shows the **Rand's performance since 1971** (in **Black**) reflecting the *average annual* exchange rate by year, and the trendline for the period.

Taking a look at the long term history of the Rand provides some indication as to where we can expect the Rand in the future.

So, what can we learn from this?

- The average depreciation per annum compounded is **6.7%** for the period 1971 to 2009 (**Red** line). This means that the currency has had to adjust by an average of 6.7% year on year during these 39 years for South African goods to continue to be competitive.

- The **Green** Trendline from 1971 to 2009 shows the undervaluation of the spike in price in late 2001 and overvaluation extent of the counter movement since mid-2003.

This long-term Trendline indicates that the average rate for 2009 should have been **R11.00/\$** – compared with an actual average rate for the year of around R8.43/\$.


- The **Blue** linear Trendline indicates that the average rate for 2009 should have been **R8.00/\$**

So, based on a long term historical trend, the Rand's true trendline value in 2009 was between **R8.00 and R11.00** and should be expected to depreciate at around **6.7% per annum**.

However, when we looked at this, we believed this period could be seen to be too long a view considering the considerable changes that had taken place in South Africa since 1994:

- abolition of apartheid,
- establishment of a democratic government
- scrapping of the Financial Rand
- reduction of import duties
- monetary policy tied to inflation targeting

So we then looked at the period since the Financial Rand was discontinued in February 1995 and ceased to exercise an abnormal influence on the Rand currency market:



The above Graph (**Black** line) shows the Rand movement since February 1995 to date, reflecting the daily rate since that date, showing the rise from under R4.00/\$ up to the peak of R13.85 in December 2001 and then down to the low of R5.65 in 2004 before rising up to the R11.85 level last year before falling back down below the R8.00 level again.

Based on the actual present exchange rate in May of **R7.65/\$**, the average historical depreciation has been **5.2%** per annum since February 1995 (dashed **Brown** line).

Then, off this data, we computed four different trendlines:

Feb 1995 – May 2010 Trendline A (Red)

We first computed a linear regression trendline from February 1995 to date.

This takes into account both the abnormal depreciation in Q4 2001, culminating in the 2 day spike above R13/\$ in December 2001, and the extended overcorrection below R7.00/\$ and excursion below R6.00/\$ before the rapid move back up last year and then back down again the past months.

This updated trendline has an annual depreciation of **3.7%** and indicates the Rand should at present be **R8.55/\$**

Feb 1995 - Oct 2001 Extended Trendline B (Green)

We then excluded the period of the above-mentioned aberrations following October 2001, and produced a linear regression trendline with this data.

- This trendline has a depreciation of **10.6%** per annum, and, when extrapolated, indicates the Rand should at present be **R14.45/\$**

"Floor Rate" Extended Trendline C (Yellow)

The third trendline we generated was an absolute "floor rate" trendline, based on strongest Rand levels over the same period as Trendline B above – Feb 1995 to October 2001 (i.e. excluding the late 2001 and 2008 aberrations)

- This reflects an annual depreciation of **9.7%**, and when extrapolated, indicates the Rand should not be stronger than **R12.50** to the Dollar at present

Feb 1995 – May 2010 Polynomial Trendline D (Blue)

Instead of a pure linear regression, we have produced a polynomial regression for the full period, which is a curve-fitting trendline instead of a linear one.

As you will notice, this curve effectively oscillates about Trendline A (**Red** line).

- This "curve-fitting" trendline indicates that the Rand's fair value is **R9.55** to the Dollar at present.

5) "BUT IT IS DUE TO DOLLAR WEAKNESS" – OR IS IT?

In 2004, there was a large contingent out there that said that the Rand's strength was purely due to Dollar weakness, and we have


similar sentiments being expressed now. This perhaps had some merit outwardly...

...but was it *the truth then*?

....And is it the *truth now*?

We analyze this argument too, by looking at the **Trade Weighted Value** of the Rand – how it measures up against a trade-related basket of currencies, not just the Dollar.

Firstly, we have to determine the trend of the Trade Weighted Value of the Rand, which we show below in an updated Chart.



The above Graph shows the monthly Trade Weighted value of the Rand (source: SA Reserve Bank) from 1990 to date (**Black Line**)

Based off this data, we have computed two trendlines:

May 1990 – May 2010 Trendline A (Red)

We first computed a linear regression trendline from May 1990 to date (**Red line**).

- This indicates that the May 2010 Trendline Trade Weighted Value is **41.97** compared with an Actual Trade Weighted Value of **74.64** (base being 100 in year 2000).

The above data enabled us to produce a Deviation (**Orange line**) between the Actual Trade Weighted Value (**Black line**) from the regression Trendline Trade Weighted Value over the same period (**Red line**).

This data reveals a very interesting picture:

- In December 2001, the Rand was 41% *undervalued* compared with its trendline Trade Weighted Value.
- In April 2006, the Rand was 31% *overvalued* compared with its trendline Trade Weighted Value
- Over the next couple of years, with the depreciation of the Rand against its trading partners, this reduced to being only 6% *overvalued* by October 2008.
- However, as of May 2010, this has now increased to **78% overvalued**, indicating the Rand is significantly more overvalued on this basis than it was in 2006.

More on this just now.

May 1990 – May 2010 Polynomial Trendline B (Blue)

We have also produced a polynomial regression for the full period – a curve-fitting trendline rather than a linear trendline.

Again, as you will notice, this curve effectively oscillates about Trendline A (**Red line**).


- This analysis indicates that the May 2010 Polynomial Trendline Trade Weighted Value is **60.27** compared with an Actual Trade Weighted Value of **74.64** (base being 100 in year 2000).

Again, we have used this data to produce a Deviation (**Aqua line**) between the Actual Trade Weighted Value (**Black line**) from the Polynomial Trendline Trade Weighted Value over the same period (**Blue line**).

As can be seen, the variance is not as marked as the linear trendline, but we can still deduce the following:

- In December 2001, the Rand was 29% *undervalued* compared with its trendline Trade Weighted Value.
- In April 2006, the Rand was 20% *overvalued* compared with its polynomial trendline Trade Weighted Value
- Over the next couple of years, with the depreciation of the Rand against its trading partners, this reversed again to being 22% *undervalued* by October 2008.
- However, as of May 2010, this has reversed once again to **24% overvalued**, indicating that the Rand is more overvalued than it was in 2006.

Now, in order to interpret this data in numbers that are meaningful, we have incorporated the Dollar/Rand rates that result from the above two deviation lines into the below chart.



This chart now reflects the following:

- The actual Dollar/Rand exchange rate from 1990 to date (**Black Line**)
- An adjusted Rand exchange rate, computed by adjusting the actual monthly exchange rate by the Deviation Factors (referred to above), in respect of:

- The linear regression trendline (**Red** line).
- The polynomial regression trendline (**Blue** line).

By applying this Deviation Factor to the actual Rand exchange rates, we can establish what **the Rand's trendline rate would be** for the period 1990 to date **based on international competitiveness with trading partners**.

...that is, recognizing currency movements of *all* the economies of South Africa's trading partners in relation to the Rand.

The revealing results are as follows:

A. On a linear regression basis (**Trendline A**):

- The Rand was undervalued from mid-1998 through to December 2003.
- It then moved into overvalued territory until November 2008, when it briefly touched the trendline.
- Since the 2008 peak, it has fallen again sharply into overvalued territory – and as at May 2010, grossly overvalued.
- As at **May 2010** the Rand should be **R13.55/\$** on a Trade Weighted basis – up from R13.40 in February 2010.

B. On a polynomial regression basis (**Trendline B**):

- The Rand was undervalued from July 2001 until mid-2003, before moving into overvalued territory for the next three years.
- It then remained fair-valued until December 2007, before once again heading into overvalued territory.
- Since August 2009, however, this has reversed sharply, with this trendline now indicating as at **May 2010** the Rand should be **R9.45/\$** on a Trade Weighted basis – up from R9.35 in February 2010.

Surprising stuff, considering that it has been claimed that the Rand strength was merely due to just Dollar weakness.

To summarise then, we have the following indication of where the Rand's present value lies:

39 Year History	Value	Depr p.a.
1971 - 2009 Trendline	8.00 – 11.00	6.7%
15 Year History (since abolition of apartheid & FinRand)		
Feb 1995 – May 2010 Actual	7.65	5.2%
Feb 1995 – May 2010 Trendline	8.55	3.7%
Feb 1995 – Oct 2001 Trendline	14.45	10.6%
"Floor Rate" Trendline	12.50	9.7%
Polynomial Trendline	9.55	
Trade Weighted Linear Trendline	13.55	
Trade Weighted Polynomial T/L	9.45	


BUT, as already stated, an exchange rate is an adjusting mechanism for differences in productivity and labour cost between one economy and another so that they can continue to trade competitively.

It was essential therefore to investigate how this definition of the Rand correlated with the above Trade Weighted analysis.

We needed to determine how South Africa had fared historically.

6) INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

Based on data gleaned from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, we were able to look at comparisons in Labour Cost and Productivity between South Africa and its Trading Partners.




Firstly, the above chart shows the Labour Cost Index for South Africa and its trading partners.

From this Chart, you can see that South Africa's Labour Cost Index has increased steadily – compared with its trading partners, which have actually gradually reduced slightly since 1996.


Compared with its trading partners, South Africa's labour cost has increased by **11% p.a.** since 1981, **7.0% p.a.** since 1996, and **5.8% p.a.** since 2001.

Going onto Productivity, we have used GDP per capita as a first yardstick here.



As can be clearly seen from the above Chart, South Africa is still way behind in Productivity, currently **just 21% of its trading partners** (Yellow Line), down from 40% in 1981, but improved from 13% in 2002, almost recovering to 1991 levels.

Another measurement of Productivity would be on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, shown in the Chart below.




On this basis, South Africa is currently producing **55% of its Trading Partners GDP per Capita** (Yellow Line again). This has dropped from 87% in 1981 but has recovered slightly from around the 50% level in 2001.

Compared with its trading partners on a GDP per Capita (US\$) or PPP (US\$) basis, South Africa's productivity is between **21% and 55% of its trading partners** – with a sharp drop from 1981 levels and 2008 showing not much change from mid-1990 levels

Now this computation is purely on GDP per capita and gives a good indication, but not an overall picture.

An overall comparison would be to use the data as provided by the United Nations Development Program (www.undp.org).

One of its reports provides a Human Development Index (HDI) which is a composite measurement incorporating life expectancy, literacy, education and PPP GDP per capita per nation.



The above Chart (latest available data) clearly shows the true story of the progress over the past 30 years or so.

And here's the shocker:

In 2007, South Africa's Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.683 – ranking **129th out of 182 countries**.

More significantly, South Africa **dropped 42 places** between 1990 and 2007!

From the chart it can be seen that up to 1990, South Africa was not only keeping abreast of its trading partners in terms of Human Development, but improving, reaching 81% of that of its trading partners.

But since 1990, it has fallen away sharply – virtually back to 1980 levels! And by comparison, the steady upward trend of other developed and developing countries has continued, resulting in SA dropping to 72% of the HDI of its trading partners.

So, has South Africa kept up with its trading partners?

...Definitely not – we are back to where we were in 1980!

Will this affect South Africa compete with its trading partners?

...Yes, it most certainly has – and will!

The big question arises: **What has been the cause?**

Well, the following three factors have had a significant effect:

➤ HIV/AIDS Pandemic

- The United Nations estimated in 2006 that there was a 18.8% prevalence of HIV/AIDS in persons aged 15 to 49 in 2006.
- This equates to 5.5 million people living with HIV.
- In the same group 71% of deaths are caused by AIDS.
- South African average life expectancy is now 49 years, and is forecast to be 41 by 2015.
- Two macroeconomic studies quoted by the IMF estimate that average labour hours lost amounts to between 33.3% to 40% for employees with AIDS.
- Extrapolating this into the workforce, based on an estimate that 25% of the 5.5 million affected had full-developed AIDS and were employed, this would equate to a loss of close to a billion man hours per annum, or 1.5% of total man hours per annum.

➤ Black Economic Empowerment (BEE/BBBEE)

- Perhaps a touchy subject in some quarters, but the bare facts are that this is a race-based policy which has not worked and has seriously affected the South African economic machinery adversely.
- The government's implementation of this policy has meant that, in most cases competent, highly-qualified and trained persons in positions of vital importance and responsibility (in both government and quasi-government organizations as well as

public and private enterprises) have been replaced by unqualified and incompetent persons purely on the basis of skin colour.

- This has resulted in a significant reduction in efficiency and productivity, an increase in corruption, and a breakdown in the country's essential services and infrastructure – affecting Health Services, Education, Electricity Supply, Fuel and Power Supply, Crime Prevention and Transportation networks.
- The Eskom electricity debacle is a case in point. How many billions have been lost due to bad planning, a lack of foresight and preventative maintenance?
- The enforced policing of this policy in businesses has resulted in a similar reduction in efficiency and productivity.

➤ Emigration of Skilled Labour/Professionals

- A secondary effect of BEE (directly or indirectly) is the massive exodus of skills, qualifications and experience, especially of professionals and highly skilled tradesmen, who either cannot get work in South Africa due to BEE implementation and/or have left due to the breakdown in essential services and increase in crime.
- Statistics released by the SA Institute of Race Relations in 2007 said that one million white people had left the country.
- This is set to rise even more after recent ongoing power outages and political uncertainty – just in January 2008 applications for emigration increased 400% with some migration consultants claiming the largest recorded enquiries in 23 years.
- These skills will take years to be replaced, some never, and has a serious impact on this country's ability to compete with its trading partners.

We can now summarise this data regarding International Competitiveness:

- **SA labour cost** has increased at a higher rate than its international trading partners – **11%** annually since 1981, although this has improved to **5.8%** since 2001.
- **SA productivity** is between **21% and 54%** of its trading partners and has decreased while increases were achieved by its trading partners – a differential of **5.8%** annually since 1981, although this has improved marginally (0.5%) since 2001.
- **SA Human Development Index** has fallen sharply since 1995 – almost back to 1980 levels – while all its trading partners have increased steadily.
- The three major Secondary Factors highlighted above all show in no uncertain terms that **risks to the upside have increased dramatically** in the recent short term, with the real

effects on the economy probably still to be felt.

Since 1996 the situation seems to have improved, but from an overall perspective it would appear we have not moved too far at all, if the Human Development Index is anything to go by.

Using these data, we produced a summary comparing **South Africa's competitiveness with its trading partners** - broken down into Quantifiable, Semi-definable and Indefinable Effects:

	Annual Differentials		
	1981-2008	2001-2008	Future
Primary Factors (Quantifiable Effects)	16.7%	5.4%	5.4%
Labour Cost	11.0%	5.8%	5.8%
Productivity	5.8%	-0.5%	-0.5%
Secondary Factors (Semi-definable Effects)	2.0%	2.0%	5.0%
AIDS Pandemic			↑
Black Economic Empowerment			↑
Emigration of Skilled Labour/Professionals			↑
Structural Factors (Indefinable Effects)		1.0%	4.0%
Infrastructure Inefficiencies (Transportation/Energy/Fuel)			↑
Crime and Security Factors			↑
Immigration Burden Costs			↑
Illiteracy/Education Levels			↓ ?
Unemployment Burden Costs			↑
Delivery Costs (remoteness from major markets)			→
Total		8.4%	14.4%

Based on the above facts and assumptions,

The differential in competitiveness between South Africa and its trading partners is estimated to have been around **8.4% annually the past 7 years**, with the future in all likelihood looking a lot bleaker, **possibly as high as 14.4%**.

7) THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY - A SIMPLISTIC VIEW

We then asked the question: How is the economy affected by the Exchange Rate?

When looking at the performance of an economy, economists speak in terms of Trade Account, Services Account, Current Account, Balance of Payments, Net Capital Inflows, etc.

But what do these terms and numbers actually mean? Can we relate these numbers to an ordinary business, and if so, how?

Well, consider this:

If South Africa had NO trade or business transactions with any other country, would there be a necessity for an exchange rate?**NO**

Would the Rand have an external value?**NO**

Since 1992, South Africa is NOT a closed economy (not one which has no external trade transactions), but is heavily dependent on foreign trade.

The simplistic viewpoint set out hereunder helps to explain a complex situation:

Consider South Africa to be a huge business venture, a private company, called **Republic of South Africa (Pty) Ltd**, and that:

- All persons are employees of RSA (Pty) Ltd

- There are various departments in RSA (Pty) Ltd making up the supply chain so that ultimate finished goods are sold to other companies i.e. exported to other countries.
- The interdepartmental transfers (trade within South Africa), although value added, are not accounted as turnover and profits, it is the finished goods and services when exported, and sold at profit, that achieve turnover and profits for RSA (Pty) Ltd.

The economic data relating to South Africa's foreign trade can be restructured in a form which suits this simple Company viewpoint, as set out in the Income Statement below (data in Rand billions):

Income Statement for RSA (Pty) Ltd									
Ordinary Description	Technical Description	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Sales	Exports	333	291	311	358	448	534	704	556
Cost of Sales	Imports	-283	-265	-312	-360	-477	-574	-740	-554
Gross Profit/Loss	Trade Balance	50	27	-1	-2	-29	-41	-36	2
Other Revenue	Offshore Services	57	68	69	80	93	110	123	118
	Offshore Investment Interest/Dividends	20	18	18	26	37	43	42	27
Expenditures	Foreign-sourced Services	-70	-75	-85	-104	-126	-148	-178	-166
	Foreign Investment Interest/Dividends	-47	-51	-43	-54	-69	-109	-113	-78
Net Other Revenue	Services Account	-41	-39	-42	-52	-65	-104	-126	-99
Total Net Income	Current Account	10	-13	-43	-54	-94	-145	-162	-97
	% of GDP	0.8%	-1.0%	-3.0%	-3.5%	-5.3%	-7.2%	-7.1%	-4.0%
Cash outflow requiring short-term funding:									
Bank Overdraft/Loans	Foreign-sourced Loans	0	-13	-43	-54	-94	-145	-162	-97

Understandably, there is no scope in this summary to comment on the above data in detail – **but please study it yourself**. When we did in 2004 for the first time, and with every update since –

It was for us the **Exposé of the Rand!**

As can be seen from the above Income Statement, RSA (Pty) Ltd had a good year in 2002, recording a *Gross Profit* (Trade Surplus) of R50.2bn and a *Net Profit* (Current Account Surplus) of R9.7bn.

But that was the last. Since 2003, trade performance started sagging and the situation has progressively deteriorated:

- In 2004, a Gross Profit had reversed into a small Gross Loss, while Net Other Revenue loss had also increased, resulting in a worrying R42.9 billion Total Net Loss, which further deteriorated in 2005 to a R54.5 billion loss.
- And then in 2006, Gross Loss (Trade Deficit) deteriorated sharply to R29.2bn, and Net Other Revenue (Services Deficit) further deteriorated, with Total Net Loss (Current Account deficit) hitting R94 billion!
- In 2007, both Gross Loss (Trade Deficit) and Net Other Revenue (Services Deficit) deteriorated further (by 38% and 61% respectively), with a Total Net Loss (Current Account deficit) at an alarming R145 billion!
- The overall rot continued in 2008. Gross Loss (Trade Deficit) reduced slightly, but Net Other Revenue (Services Deficit) loss grew again steadily to nearly double that of 2006, pushing Total Net Loss (Current Account deficit) to a record **R162 billion!**
- The last year has seen a turnaround on the trade side, with this turning into a small Gross Profit (Trade Surplus), and with Net Other Revenue (Services Deficit)

reducing by 22%, this resulted in an improved Total Net Loss (Current Account deficit) of R97 billion.

The change in 2009 can be attributed mostly to the effect of the global recession, which reduced exports, but reduced imports more (as consumer demand dropped sharply) and foreign investment interest and dividends fell along with global interest rates and company profits.

The change in trend is encouraging, but overall, is this a good performance? Should the "directors" feel happy with the performance of the company?

Well, until quite recently they seemed to be happy until quite recently – *but only because their bankers have been happy to finance this escalating net loss*.

But who are these bankers?

Mostly, short-term investors, seeking higher yields. And just like any short-term financier, at the first sign of trouble, what do they do? *Recall their loan or investment*.


8) HAS GDP GROWTH BEEN HEALTHY GROWTH?

Now, a question will no doubt arise, being:

"What about the amazing growth that has been experienced the past few years – GDP of around 5%?"

How can this be so, if the foreign trade picture is really as stark as is spelt out above?"

Well, we take a look at these aspect of economic activity as well as their correlation.



The above charts shows the GDP growth per annum for the past 40 years, and to what extent exports contributed to it.

As can be seen, historically up to the early 1980s, when exports as a percentage of GDP have been high, GDP figures have been good, while a sharp fall in export composition has coincided with poor economic growth in the years through to mid-1990s, followed by a period of increased exports and higher GDP growth.


How was it then, when exports declined to low levels in 2003-2005, that the local economy was experiencing a sustained boom in growth?

Exports contribute some 25%-35% to GDP, but what is the biggest component by far?

Private consumption.

This sector contributes over 60% to the Gross Domestic Product, and this boom in consumer demand has been the driver behind the growth the past few years...

But has it been healthy demand? The below chart tells us in no uncertain terms – No, it has not!




What has happened? From the chart above, one can see:

- Domestic Credit has grown to 89% of GDP in 2008 from 56% in 1993 – mostly since 2002 when it was 65%. The credit crisis has seen this reduce to 85% in 2009.
- Household Debt as a Percentage of Disposable Income has risen from just 52% in 2002 to 81% in 2008, reducing slightly to 80% in 2009.

In essence, consumer demand has been on the back of an explosion in credit extension, and thus GDP growth has been achieved, but at a high price – more and more consumer debt!

Admittedly, not to the same extent that has been seen in the US and some other countries, but nevertheless, not a healthy situation at all, as this is exactly what caused the credit crisis and meltdown overseas!



We started to feel the effects and fallout from the global economic downturn as early as 1st Quarter 2008, not only from that but also

from the local economic downturn, as asset prices plunged and the consumer mood shifted sharply to being debt-averse.

As reflected in the Chart above, the 7.4% decline in GDP for the 1st Quarter 2009 is the largest decline for the past half-century.

Despite the positive growth of 0.9% and 3.2% in the 3rd and 4th quarters respectively and the optimism that this is a short-lived recession, we beg to differ.

The above sharp decline in early 2009 is a clear indication that this is a sustained recession (Depression) that we have entered, especially seeing that the decline has mostly been in manufacturing, which is critical to a healthy economy. As can be seen, exports as a percent of GDP has dropped dramatically the past year, *with no improvement, despite the better GDP figures.*

We expect the ratios of Debt to GDP to remain high, which is an ongoing concern, as the cause of this disaster has not been remedied!

The question is how much of this debt will be able to be serviced as we enter deeper into negative growth, and as asset prices decline further?


So, on reflection, has GDP growth been healthy growth?

No, not at all, as we will show further.

9) EXPORTS AND THE TRADE ACCOUNT

As can be readily seen from the Income Statement table of annual results in Section 7, it is imperative that South Africa achieves a positive Trade Balance (Exports exceeding Imports), to offset the Services Account, which has always run in negative territory.

For a start, let's review the long-term history of the Trade Account.



The Trade Account History chart above shows clearly that from 1970 until 2002 exports exceeded imports, and the resulting Trade Account Surplus more than offset the Services Account Deficit, which has steadily increased year on year (more on this later).

However, from 2003 the situation reversed dramatically, with Imports outstripping Exports to such an extent that from a record Trade Surplus we tumbled to a Trade Deficit in just 2 years.

From this Chart, it is undeniable that this dramatic change was due to the effects of a “strong Rand” filtering through. Many companies lost long term contracts to other economies, perhaps never to regain them, with resultant closure of many SA export manufacturing facilities.

In fact, according to the Bureau for Economic Research, a survey in 2005 revealed that 40% of manufacturers had closed their export facilities – for good!

No! for bad – and forever!

But, the “strong Rand” has been a double-edged sword, damaging manufacturer's export *and* domestic market areas. True that this state of affairs forced innovative reductions in costs, and production efficiencies, but when these thrifting actions have been exhausted, the **economic mechanism – the Rand exchange rate – is needed to maintain secondary sector business**, so essential to this economy.

But this has failed, through the Authorities' publicly stated support, until recently, of a “strong Rand”.


We must add that the dramatic about-turn in stance the past few months from various Government and SARB officials has been most conspicuous, and encouraging.

As can be further seen, this change in trend to a Trade deficit, which started in 2003, was not short-lived but continued for the next few years:

- In 2005, the Deficit increased five-fold to R7.7bn
- And in 2006, it fell almost five-fold again to register a massive R42.5bn loss!
- There was a marginal improvement in 2007 and 2008 with R40.2bn loss and R35.6bn loss being recorded respectively.
- 2009 has seen a reversal of this trend, to record a small surplus of R2.3bn, but this is not due to increased Exports (which have dropped sharply), but due to Imports contracting even more.

And, how has early 2010 progressed?

Let's have a closer look at the last 5 years' performance, based on the trade data released by SARS.



The above Chart shows an encouraging change the past 12 month in terms of the Trade Balance, but although this is so, as can be clearly seen, the reason for this positive balance is not an increase in Exports, because as can be seen from the green bar chart, **Exports have reduced on average by 34% from the peak in 2008!**

However, what has masked the picture is that domestic demand has reduced by a bigger percentage – *a massive 40% reduction* since the peak in 2008! Which has turned the balance positive.

Of importance, this Export/Import data as reported by SARS are invoice-based data, whereas the data reported by the Reserve Bank are foreign cashflow data.

Consequently, there are timing differences between the data that is reported. Historically, these differences have been significant.

It will therefore be interesting to see how the Trade surplus trend will continue in the 1st Quarter 2010 SARB Bulletin (due 24 June).

But of course, the Trade Account only makes up a portion of the Current Account – the other being the Services Account.

10) THE SERVICES ACCOUNT DILEMMA


As already spelt out in Section 7, there are two income generating sources in an economy – actual export of physical goods (Trade Account); and then selling of exported services and offshore investment income (Services Account).

There has been considerable public comment and concern on the Trade Account situation, and with good reason too.

But it is the Services Account that should be of just as much concern, in fact much more, with the trend that has developed.

The next Chart gives the Quarterly history from 1990.

- As can be seen, there was a gradual increase in the Service Account Deficits up to 2002.
- There followed a short-term recovery until early 2004, after the Rand dropped below its Trade Weighted Value in 2003.
- Since then, the Service Account Deficit more than **trebled** to hit a record **R137bn** (q.a.) in 3rd Quarter 2008 and a record annual deficit of R126bn for the full year.



- The last 5 quarters have seen an encouraging reduction from

an escalating Deficit back to around R100bn (q.a.), but nevertheless, the overall trend is clear, and rather alarming. What is the cause of the deteriorating trend of the Services Account, and why should this be of increasing concern?

Well, the major portion of the Service Account deficit is due to Interest and Dividend Payments remitted offshore.

In simple business terms, as an economy, we have been trading at *a loss in both the tangible and intangible* areas of operation, in other words, both Trade and Services Accounts since mid-2004 (with the exception of the past three quarters).

Consequently, we have needed to borrow money from offshore (Net Foreign Inflows) to fund these losses – but don't forget, these investors are here to get a return on their investment:

The higher your borrowings, the higher your interest cost

...the higher your interest cost, the bigger your loss

...the bigger your loss, the more you need to borrow

... it becomes a vicious circle.

But then, as some have proclaimed, we have had the distinct advantage that there has not been the need to rely solely on these short-term borrowings, with their indeterminable recall timing, because there has been substantial foreign investment of a permanent character!

However unpalatable as our comments might be, the actual facts are that some of this country's major income-generating assets have been sold offshore to foreign companies.

Great! We have foreign inflow (to fund the Current Account).

BUT, the profits generated by these companies since then are being remitted as dividends out of this country to the new shareholders, and are no longer for this economy's benefit.

And the boomerang result? – an increasing outflow of funds through increased dividend payments that have, or will soon, surpass the initial capital inflow – and it will not stop then...but continue for years to come!

These are two major reasons why the Service Account Deficit has continued to escalate, and we believe that, in business terms, this becomes a whirlpool that is almost impossible to escape from.

But yet we have sailed along the past few years quite complacent that our bankers (short-term investors) are happy with our performance – or maybe just tolerant of our bad performance...

Just like a bank that is happy to take their pound of flesh from a company that is in dire straits, knowing that they can pull their "investment" out at any time...which time, it seems, has now come (more on this later!)


11) HAVE WE BENEFITTED FROM GOLD & WILL WE?

This study would not be complete without addressing Gold – historically the bright side and strength of this economy.

What about the bullishness of gold – is this the reason for the Rand's strength after 2003 and, more importantly, will this not support the Exchange Rate and the economy going forward, recognizing that South Africa has been largest producer globally of some major commodities?

Is it correct that this economy, in a global sense, is a "commodity-based economy" and will rise or fall with the fortunes of the commodity market internationally?


Let's take a look at the performance of this well-nurtured prized asset over the past few decades – SA's foreign exchange earner!



The above Chart tells us the following:

- From 1950 to early 1970s, Gold Exports represented around 30-35% of Total Exports.
- By the time the Gold price peaked in 1981, Total Exports had increased more than 7 times and Gold Exports by more than 11 times, making up 45% of Total Exports!
- Since the mid-1980s, Total Exports have steadily increased in Dollar terms.
- Over this period, however, Gold Exports have **steadily decreased** to just **6-8%** of Total Exports the past 6 years – and this, despite the Gold price (in Dollars) having *more than trebled* over this period of time!

To further highlight, we attach another Chart which shows the actual volume (not value) of Gold exported by year.




The above chart tells the dismal story as it is:

- Actual volume of Gold exported has reduced substantially the past 30 years – from over 30 million Troy ounces in the 1970's to below 10 million the past 5 years.
- And noticeably, despite the Gold price having more than doubled since 2000, this trend has continued.
- And in 2009, with the Gold price at its best levels for over two decades, South Africa exported the smallest volume in living memory – just 6.5 million ounces (that is 209 metric tonnes) – 20% less than 2007!


We have all probably taken it as an accepted fact that South Africa has always been, still is, and will always be the largest gold producer internationally.

However, with the astonishing deterioration in the Gold output performance, we decided to take a closer look at this situation.



The above pie-chart shows Gold production by volume by country in 1970, with South Africa producing over two-thirds of the world's gold – more than double the rest of the world put together – with the next largest the former USSR at just 13.7%.

Let's roll on a few years to 2009 – what a dramatic change!



From the above Chart you can see **South Africa has lost its long-held crown** of the world's largest Gold producer – to China (who would've believed China would become the world's largest

producer of Gold?).

And not only that, having dropped to 8.7% (from 9.8% in 2008), South Africa has also dropped below both Australia and the USA as well in terms of output.

So, to get back to the question:

"What effect does Gold have on our total economy?"

The truth is that, apart from lingering remembrance of a commodity-based economy – **VERY little!**

Furthermore, have these mining industry casualties of a strong Rand escaped the attention that they ought to have been given?


- the alarming extent of closure of gold mines and precious metal mines in recent years?
- And, as concerning, the abandoning of plans to proceed with new exploitation ventures of precious metals?
- And, more concerning still, the possible closure of more mines due to enforced rationing of electricity supply?!

12) THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT CONCERN

We have highlighted how the Trade Balance (Gross Profit/Loss) turned to a deficit (loss) as a consequence of declining exports (and of escalating cheaper imports challenging domestic manufacture) and how the Services Account (Net Other Revenue) has deteriorated –

But how has this affected the Current Account (Net Profit/Loss)? Let's look at the history.

The long term Chart of the Current Account History reflects historical Trade, Services and Current Account data in Rand from 1970 through to 2009, plotted against the Rand/Dollar Exchange Rate, and its long-term trendline.




What does this tell us about the economy's performance, especially during the "strong Rand" performance commencing 2002 to 2007?

- From about 1990 through to 2003 the Trade Account was in

surplus reaching a peak in 2002.

- During this same period the Current Account fluctuated between R10bn surplus and R20bn deficit.
- Since 2003, when the Rand fell below its long-term Trendline, the situation steadily deteriorated – and at an increasing rate, with 2007 and 2008 recording massive Current Account deficits of R145bn and R162bn respectively – **both over 7.0% of GDP!**

To take a closer look at the more recent history, below is a Chart of Quarterly Current Account data since 2001:



As can be seen from this data:

- In 2002, the Trade Account (physical exports less imports) was showing a healthy surplus (profit) of some R50bn, which neatly offset the Services Account deficit (other income less other expenditures), resulting in a small Current Account surplus (Net Profit) of ±R10bn.
- By mid-2004, the Trade Account had dropped to breakeven, while the Services Account remained at fairly constant levels, with the resultant Current Account now in negative territory by some R50bn.
- In 2005, the Services Account now started showing larger deficits (losses).
- The following 3 years saw further deterioration, especially on the Services Account, with the resultant Current Account Deficit hitting a record R192bn (q.a.) for 1st Quarter 2008.

With the next 3 quarters still recording large Services Account deficits, this resulted in the aforementioned record Current Account Deficit of R169bn for the full year 2008.

- In 2009, the Trade Account deteriorated again in 1st Quarter,

but the Services account deficit reduced slightly further, which pushed the Current Account Deficit to R158bn (q.a.).

- Then, in the next 3 Quarters of 2009 (highlighted), the Trade Account recorded surpluses – the first in over 5 years! We believe this can be attributed to the following:

Firstly, the weakening of the Rand towards the end of 2008 generated improved Export revenues in the quarters following, and suppressed Imports due to higher landed cost.

Secondly, the global recession reduced the volume of both Export and Import demands, but as already noted, Imports to a greater extent than Exports.


Overall, however, we have been running with a considerable Current Account Deficit (Net Loss) for the past few years.

The ongoing concern is that this Current Account Deficit (our cashflow shortfall from operating activities) needs to be funded.

13) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS – THE ACHILLES HEEL

So, the next aspect to look at is how this shortfall has been funded, and what certainty there is of this being funded in future.

In order to determine this, we provide herewith a Chart which analyzes the financial flows as reported by the Reserve Bank.



The above graph shows 3 sets of data:

- The top Bar Chart section shows the 3 recorded investment transactions types (LHS scale), being Foreign Direct Investment (**Navy**), Portfolio Investment (**Aqua**) and Other Investment (**Green**).
- The middle Chart (RHS scale) is the Total Recorded Transactions (being a sum of the above 3 sets of data – **Red** line) and the Net Inflows (including Unrecorded Transactions – **Black** line), with the Area portion (**Yellow**) being the Current Account Deficit per Quarter.
- And below that we have the average Dollar/Rand graph superimposed against this data (**Blue** line).

What does this set of data tell us?

- From the time the Current Account went into Deficit in 2003, Total Recorded Transactions (**Red** line) were on average sufficient to fund the growing deficit (**Yellow** area).
- Of these recorded transactions, Portfolio inflows (into the JSE and Bond market) have been an essential element to the funding of the Current Account Deficit and these inflows were robust for several years before starting to reverse in the last quarter of 2007.
 - Then 4th Quarter 2007 recorded a net foreign portfolio outflow of R6bn, the first since 2003, followed by an outflow of R22bn in 1st Quarter 2008.
 - 2nd Quarter 2008 saw portfolio inflows turn slightly positive again, but, as the global crisis caused a rush to safe-havens and away from risky assets, the next two Quarters recorded massive portfolio outflows, 4Q2008 a mind-numbing **R108bn!**

So, let's look at how the books were balanced during this 12 month period:

Firstly, you will notice that it is only in the periods of negative portfolio inflows that there was any significant Foreign Direct Investment, which can be reduced to a few large transactions:

- 2001 – DeBeers/Anglo American
- 2005 – Barclays/ABSA and Vodafone/Vodacom
- 2007 – Bain Capital/Edcon
- 2008 – ICBC/Standard Bank

As we have already stated, whereas these inflows might look like good direct investment, *it is just the opposite* – the selling off of our profit-generating assets!

Not one of these has been incremental investment – i.e. new permanent income-generating assets!

But as can be seen from the **Orange** blocked area in 2008, even with these inflows, there was a gaping hole between the Total Recorded Inflows (**Red** line) and the Current Account Deficit (**Yellow** area)...

.... And it required **huge Unrecorded Transactions** to balance the cashflow.

So, the ship has been kept afloat by short-term investors funds, by selling off our assets, and with record unrecorded transactions! (b.t.w. *How does SARB record unrecorded transactions?*)

Does this sound look a good picture? To us it doesn't.

As we have warned repeatedly, since we first released our findings in 2004, that these offshore investors (in the bond and money markets particularly) can and will recall their funds immediately they see their capital being at risk...

...be it, another sharp drop in global stock markets, our own "subprime" fallout... or some political event that would cause investor uncertainty...

...and that a sharp adjustment in the Rand would result.

And that is what we saw in 2001 and again in 2008 (as shown by

the arrows), when large portfolio outflows resulted in a sharp depreciation of the Rand to record multi-year lows as a result.

Then finally, in regard to 2009, we saw the short-term fund inflows return to some extent and we have seen the Rand return to strong levels below R8.00.

Does that mean everything is back to normal?

We think not. We still see the market is primed for a new set of jitters, and as a result we forecast:

- More net outflows again as "short-term bankers" withdraw their funds from the market at any sign of trouble, and
- a drop once again in the Rand's value.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed...

14) THE TRUTH – OUR CONCLUSION ...

This is the essence of an extensive study on the Rand, which we originally researched during 2004 and have updated and expanded most quarters since then.

The purpose of this summary is to indicate to readers the direction of thought, and appropriate weighting placed on basic fundamental economic data, in order to assess on a rational scientific basis where the Rand can be expected to move in the future.

Other valid factors that can affect the Rand, such as being an emerging market, do not form part of this study or its conclusions.

Our science is a collaboration of 3 sets of data:

- **Historical Trendline of the Rand since 1971, using four different assumptions**
- **Trade Weighted Value of The Rand since 1990, using two different assumptions**
- **Competitiveness of the South African economy**

All these indicate the following:

1. Intrinsic value of the Rand in May 2010 is within the range **R8.55 - R14.45**, and
2. Economic Factors will combine to force a correction of the Rand back to its intrinsic value indicated above, and
3. The Rand will continue to depreciate for the foreseeable future at a *bare minimum* of **5.2%** annually, but **more likely around 8.4%** – and maybe as high as **14.4% annually**.

So, the recent move below this range means the Rand is very overvalued at these levels, and economic factors will combine to force the Rand back to equilibrium, as we have seen before.


That still leaves a one BIG question...

15) CAN FUTURE RAND MOVES BE FORECAST?

It's all very well knowing that the Rand is overvalued, but it remained there for years before moving back up.

Who knew when it would move up from early 2005?

And now that we have seen the Dollar/Rand move down all the way to below R7.50, where is it likely to go from here?



Is it likely to fall further, and if so, strongly or gradually, by how much, and when?

Or will we see it rise strongly from these levels? And if so, how far could it go? And by when?

Is it possible to answer these questions?

We had not thought so, until in 2004 we discovered the *most advanced forecasting technology available* and started applying its uncanny abilities to forecast the Rand.

And this is what this technology told us as early as March 2005:



As can be seen from the above chart, this technology forecast:

- that the market had bottomed out at 5.60 on 31 December 2004
- and that it was expected to rise over the next few years, most probably above 11.00.

This confirmed the results of our study based on a fundamental view – the Rand was clearly overvalued and was expected to revert back to more equitable levels in the next few years.

Further, since October 2005 we have been publishing these forecasts on a daily basis, and have managed to clock up an **accuracy of over 80%** over short, medium and long term.

To give some indication of how powerful this information is, we provide herewith more recent forecasts:

On 22 February 2008, we published this Chart for the most likely scenario for the **Next Few Years** and forecast the following:

The market is expected to rise above 10.90, more likely into the 11.80 to 18.00 area the next few years.



And what happened?

The market rose over the next few months to make a high of 11.8615 on 22 October 2008

And then, just a week before the market topped out, on 18 October 2008 we published this Chart for the most likely scenario for the **Next Few Months**.



And in the forecast we said the following:

The market is expected to top out between current levels and 12.00, but possibly as high as 16.00 (with resistance at 11.20) before falling back down probably into the 9.5000 to

8.6000 area...

This is what happened:

The market rose to make a high of 11.8615 on 22 October 2008 before falling below 9.50 a week later and making a low of 9.1700 on 31 December 2008

Another spot-on forecast.


This is extremely valuable information to have on hand with long term planning and budgeting, but more importantly...

Where is it likely to be heading in the short and medium term now that we have seen the market move strongly back down below R7.50 the past year?

Well, we can show you – with chances being that **8 out of 10 times** we are correct.

In fact, our forecasting technology in October last year picked up a significant pattern, which gave us an extremely good idea as to where the Rand was heading the next few months...

...in particular, what we showed our clients on 14 October 2009 in our Next Few Weeks chart (copied below), when the Rand was at R7.27 to the Dollar, **was potent!**



Because the forecast commentary read as follows:

The market has moved down into the target area and is expected to bottom out in the 7.3250 to 7.0500 area ... Once complete, expect the market to rise very strongly, with a break above 7.5065 targeting 7.7845 then 8.2365 and above.

Which is exactly what happened in the "next few weeks":

The market hit a low of 7.1925 the next day before rising the next 2 weeks to hit a high of 8.2505

How would YOU like this sort of crystal ball in YOUR hands? Quite seriously, if you are affected by the fluctuations of the Rand in any way, you need to ask yourself these questions:

- Have you ever been caught buying or selling your Dollars just before the market moved strongly in your favour?

- Do you find yourself panicking when you need to trade?
- Have you ever missed out on a good price because you thought the market would move further?

...And then waited for the market to bounce back, which it never did, and you eventually were forced to get out at a loss, or a substantially reduced profit?

- Do you spend an inordinate amount of time trying to find out where the market is heading?
- Do you wake up at night sweating, or worrying where the market is going?

If your answer to any of these questions is **Yes** – we can well understand that – and what is more, we can help you.

We have been there ourselves. And it is stressful, living in a world of uncertainty, and feeling like the market is against you.

BUT, we have found the solution. And **YOU** could well have too...

Having access to our forecasting service, and being able to see where the market is likely to head in the short, medium and long term, can mean a wonderful change to your trading – and to your stress levels:

- You live in a world of probabilities, not unknowns
- You can trade the Rand with confidence
- You are able to maximize profits on each trade – 8 times out of 10
- You live a far less stressful life – no more headaches, no more waking up at night, no more stomach ulcers
- You have more time to spend on other things

So, if you are tired of guessing where the market is going, tired of the stress involved in deciding when to trade (and when not to):

Take advantage today of our SPECIAL OFFER,

backed by our Iron-Clad 30 Day Money back Guarantee.

Try it out for a full 30 days. We can guarantee you will see the markets as you have never seen them before.

And if for whatever reason you believe it is not for you, simply cancel and we will refund you, in full. Guaranteed.

And you will only be billed periodically thereafter as long as you continue to profit handsomely from our service.

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